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Reifying Law-Government, Law and the
Rule of Law in Governance Systems
Larry Cata' Backer*
Abstract
The roots of the current "rule of law" debate are ancient. Its
political, social and religious expressions are bound up in ancient notions
of law and government as two possibly distinct categories. Starting with
Bracton's notions of gubernaculum and jurisdictio, which together
define the character, scope and authority of coercive systems of
governance, debates about the meaning of both and their relationship
went hand in hand with the almost simultaneous construction of modem
democratic constitutional states, as well as the most authoritarian states
of the twentieth century. Gubernaculum and jurisdictio serve as the
basis for reifying law and the nature of its "rule" as the world moves
toward systems of coercive global law, understood either as common law
binding on states, or as the precursor to global governance institutions
(e.g. an International Criminal Court). But its jurisprudential expression,
especially since the mania for positivism in the construction of political
"constitutional" societies took hold in the nineteenth century, produced a
certain "amnesia" of the ancient, and often violent, contests over the
nature of law. That contest, in jurisprudential form, invoked religion,
political theory and philosophy to determine the relationship between
governance and authority.
The paper interrogates that discourse in modern terms. Using the
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gubernaculum and jurisdictio distinction in Bracton, it focuses on
Francis Bacon's defense of James I/VI's instrumentalist view of law
(separated from the normative system it expresses) and Edward Coke's
organic view of law as the embodiment of the normative values of the
political community that serves to bind and limit its government. These
opposing visions of law are then explored in the context of the
jurisprudential oppositions of nineteenth and twentieth century political
theory. Then, more broadly, the paper examines the Bacon-Coke
opposition in post-modern and global terms.
In the context of post-modem theory and globalization, the Article
emphasizes the emerging understanding of law as technique and on the
managerial aspects of modem law systems. The Article also suggests the
way in which the constitutional deadlock of seventeenth century
England, now broadened and freed of the artificial boundaries between
public and private law, reproduces itself on a global level in the twenty-
first century. To that end the Article explores the way in which the
contested understanding of law as object or subject becomes a critical
element in the management of networks of power at the international
global level and in the reconstitution of legal reification in global
common law and private transnational legal systems.
The Article ends by exploring the implications of these theories in
the construction of modem transnational constitutionalism, both secular
and theocratic. On one side are those who would resist invasion of
ancient or traditional rights by increasingly powerful and aggressive
institutional bodies-government, religion, corporation, and society.
The source of resistance is the sure belief in the power of an autonomous
reified complex of law. On the other hand, institutions, conceiving
themselves representatives of the whole or complete parts of the power
of those they represent, and convinced of the perfection of the authority
derived from such representation, resist the imposition of checks and
restraints applied in new and more restrictive ways. The source of this
resistance is the sure knowledge that law is separately constituted but is
passive and instrumental, to be used by legitimate authority in the
construction and articulation of normative standards that exist apart from
law and subordinate to the genius of the political community. And
perhaps, both the struggle and its inevitable frustration, more than
anything else, illuminates the autonomy, the distinct personalities, of law
reified, as the great insight for the twenty-first century.
I. Introduction
In the West, the relationship of law and human organization, the
relationship of law and the individual, and the relationship of the
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individual to the organizational forms individuals embrace, has been
turbulent. At various times since the seventeenth century, law has been
understood as an object separate from the state and its apparatus (usually
a government).1 In this aspect, law has been constructed as the sum of
the common relationships of the people amongst themselves-it is in this
sense the manifestation of the people themselves as an aggregate body.
Sometimes those relationships also included the political, social and
economic relations of the social order. Sometimes it did not.
Sometimes, this separate organism called law was considered superior to
the state, or at least to the political organs of state power. Sometimes it
was viewed as on par with those organs. But law, and especially the
basic law customs and laws of the community could be disturbed by the
state, through its government, only at great risk to itself.
2
At the same time, and increasingly since the seventeenth century,
law has been viewed as the expression of state power,3 or at least that of
its government.4 In this view, the state, rather than law, is understood as
organic. And law is understood as serving as the instrument of the state.
In those cases, law was viewed as either process or language.5 As a
manifestation of state power, or at least of the power of the apparatus of
state, law was considered a means of ordering that manifestation of
power, sometimes of cloaking that manifestation in process. Sometimes
law was thought to encompass the whole of the rulemaking power of any
1. In the West, the distinction between law and government goes back to the
ancients. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (William Ellis trans., J.M. Dent & Sons 1912) (350
B.C.). The division was grounded in the notion that though the magistrates, and certainly
the people, might have had direct regulatory authority, the primary focus of the state was
"executive power" as Americans have come to understand that term in the context of
their own constitutionalism. Law was essentially organic--customary-though not
completely so. But the state intruded on the customs of the people at its own peril. See
discussion infra at text and notes 12-16.
2. Thus, for example, even Jean Bodin, a great friend of the authority of the state
suggested the limits inherent in the core assumption of the relationship of state to law.
I think it extremely dangerous to make any change in the law touching the
constitution. The amendment of laws and customs touching inheritances,
contracts, or servitudes is on the whole permissible. But to touch the laws of
the constitution is as dangerous as to undermine the foundations, or remove the
comer-stone on which the whole weight of the building rests. Disturbed in this
way, apart from the risk of collapse, a building often receives more damage
than the advantage of new material is worth, especially if it is old and
decaying."
JEAN BODIN, SIX BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH Bk. IV, ch. III, 125 (M. J. Tooley
trans., Basil Blackwell 1955).
3. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR
LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE (Abraham Hayward trans., Littlewood 1975) (1814).
4. FRANCIS BACON, ESSAYS AND NEW ATLANTIS, Essay No. 56 (Classics Club ed.,
Walter J. Black, Inc. 1942) (1612).
5. See CARL SCHMITT, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY 18 (Jeffrey Seitzer trans., Duke
U. Press 2004) (1932).
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society. Sometimes law was viewed as substantially less complete-that
is, as a partial manifestation of power over behavior. Sometimes law
was seen as proceeding from the community, sometimes it was
understood to proceed from God. Sometimes law was God. Sometimes
law was God's inverse-chaos or worse. And sometimes, in Marxist
lands after 1917, law was deemed a manifestation of politics and
institutionalized class struggle.6 Thereafter in the West, "legal realists"
and elements of self-styled legal post modernism echoed this
suggestion.7 Especially since the 1990s, ironically enough, and in the
context of economic globalization, law was deemed to be largely
irrelevant, at least in its traditional forms and for its traditional
functions.
8
This turbulence, once confined to great battles over the nature of
governance and power within states, has now become a source of great
debate among those interested in the construction of transnational and
international legal systems. It underlies the disputes between those
advocating an authoritative and binding effect and power of "organic"
and customary law in international and transnational systems, and those
who view lawmaking as grounded in authentic and legitimate legal
instruments produced by positive action of some fraction of the
community of nations.
When law is said to "rule" in the West, then, it is meant to cover a
large terrain of complex and inconsistent meaning. Thus, law itself
serves as a veil over its own nature. However conceived, law remains
important to the discourse of power. That people have embraced the idea
6. Sheryl Miller reminds us that:
Chinese-Marxist legal theory views the relationship between law and politics as
a dialectic relationship. Believing that all is interconnected and that there is a
unity between opposites, Marxist scholars believe that politics and law are not
mutually exclusive. Policy is the will of the ruling class and law is the
manifestation of that policy. Under this philosophy, the law should change as
policies change. However, laws take much more time to change than policies.
Therefore, in practice as policies change, the interpretation and enforcement of
laws, rather than the laws themselves, change.
Sheryl Miller, Institutional Impediments to the Enforcement of China's Bankruptcy Laws,
8 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 187, 200 (1996).
7. See, e.g., Michael C. Doff & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267, 274 (1998) ("program of unmasking law as
politics [as] central to American Legal Realism."). Marxism and legal realism blended
nicely in some forms of critical legal theory. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary
Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89
MICH. L. REV. 707, 710 (1991) ("critical legal realists ... argued that all law is politics
and thereby impugned the neutrality and legitimacy of law.").
8. See Larry CatA Backer, Economic Globalization and the Rise of Efficient Systems
of Global Private Law Making: Wal-Mart as Global Legislator, 39 CoNN. L. REv. 1739
(2007).
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that law is a thing is beyond dispute. The exact nature of that
"thingness" is quite another story. Yet the "thingness" of law is critically
important for the ordering of power relationships among people,
institutions and communities. I am little interested in the "true" meaning
of law as an abstract proposition, or even as a question of fact. I am not
sure the question is particularly relevant, except perhaps as a means of
gaining advantage in the never ending cultural wars for control of
perceptions of meaning. Human behavior is driven by what people
believe and the choices they make in adopting certain "privileged"
beliefs when constructing their communities, rather than any abstract
truth of those beliefs.
For this essay, I explore the way in which law is reified, that is, the
way that law is sometimes understood as a thing, process, aspect or
character apart from and in addition to its particular content. And I
explore the way that this reification has been contested, that is, the
development of the notion of law as a mere instrument of power, of law
as no more than its content and no less than the power of the institutions
whose will it expresses. I suggest some of the important ways in which
law-as-a-thing-apart has been recreating itself in the post-Soviet
globalized world. I am particularly interested in the ways that law is now
said to rule. In ways reminiscent of the dynamics of conversations about
law in seventeenth century in England, law has become again
amorphous, capable of simultaneous multiple meanings. Law is an
important object for capture among those whose systems of
institutionalized power relationships require an object around which to
legitimate compulsion, behavior and the management of conduct at every
level of human organization. I then look forward to the modem
expression of these ancient conundrums by exploring the current
expression of law as technique. 9 Specifically, I explore the way in which
the contested understanding of law as object or subject becomes a critical
element in the management of networks of power at the international
global level and in the reconstitution of legal reification in global
common law and private transnational legal systems.10  I end by
exploring the implications of these theories in the construction of modem
transnational constitutionalism, both secular and theocratic."1
9. See Section II, Gubernaculum and Jurisdictio, infra.
10. See Section III, Law as Technique: The Management Networks of Power at the
International Global Level and the Reconstitution of Legal Reification in Global
Common Law, infra.
11. See Section IV, God as Law; Humanity as Law: Divergence in the Management
of State Power in Modem Constitutionalism, infra.
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II. Gubernaculum and Jurisdictio
In the seventeenth century in England and the American colonies,
law was reified as the great bulwark against personal and institutional
power. It was a thing that stood outside of the state and its apparatus, but
also within it. Law was the reification of the people and their customs,
which no single person could undo, but which mediated the relations
between the estates of the realm. Law, and especially the common law,
as a whole could not be undone by either Crown or Parliament, but
reflected them as well. Only the High Court of Parliament could serve as
a law making body.12 In this sense, law making could be understood as
exceptional, requiring the invocation of an institution representative of
all of the constituents of common law. The state and its apparatus and
the law were thus two quite different things.1 3
This understanding had ancient roots. Aristotle clearly
distinguished state (the magistrate, or power relationships) from law (the
rule, or obligation and duty of individuals and behavior regulation).
Though it was clear that there was a relationship between them, that
relationship was not vertical. Law was not merely an instrument of state
power. At the same time, the state was not merely the expression of law.
Aristotle, for example, noted, "all laws are, and ought to be, framed
agreeable to the state that is to be governed by them, and not the state to
the laws."'14  But at the same time he cautioned that "the laws are
different from what regulates and expresses the form of the constitution;
it is in their office to direct the magistrate in the execution of his office
and the punishment of offenders."' 15  Aristotle's works had been
recovered in Western Europe by the twelfth century. 16 The founders of
the American republic were well aware of Aristotle's work, including the
Politics, which formed the basis of classical education for the American
ruling classes at the time of the founding. Echoes can be found in
Madison's Federalist No. 10,17 and also in Hamilton's works. 18
12. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 51 (Cornell U. Press 1955).
13. See PAOLO GROSSI, MITOLOGiAS JURiDICAS DA MODERNIDADE (Florian6polis,
Brasil, Fundagdo Boiteux 2004).
14. ARISTOTLE, supra note 1, at Bk. IV, ch. I.
15. Id.
16. See ARTHUR HOGUE, ORIGINS OF THE COMMON LAW 90 (Liberty Fund 1986)
(1966).
17. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON & JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS NO. 10
(Penguin Classics 1987); see also, Ralph L. Ketcham, Notes on James Madison's Sources
for the Tenth Federalist Paper, 1(1) MIDWEST J. OF POLITICAL SCI. 20-25 (1957).
18. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON & JOHN JAY, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS
No. 18 (Chicago, IlI., Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 1952) (1787). See generally,
MICHAEL D. CHAN, ARISTOTLE AND HAMILTON ON COMMERCE AND STATESMANSHIP (U. of
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Its most important roots, however, were a sophisticated medieval
jurisprudence.' 9 For our purposes Bracton provides the most important
late medieval foundational source. As Charles Mcllwain well put it,20 for
English constitutionalists at the end of the medieval period, there was "a
separation far sharper than we make in our modem times between
government and law, between gubernaculum and jurisdictio.' '21 Within
the sphere of gubernaculum, the power of those who hold authority to act
is absolute. That power could be expressed by action-the enforcement
action of the state-and also by enactment of law, narrowly conceived.
The narrowness of the conception is grounded in the fundamental
distinction between enactments of an administrative character, and the
power to define a legal right. Thus, to Bracton, "leges (in the narrow
sense of the word), constitutions, and assisae are nothing more than
administrative orders, and therefore part of 'government'-something
which 'pertains to the administration of the realm (pertinet ad regni
gubernaculum)-and as such are properly within the king's exclusive
control. 22
Within the authority of government, more narrowly defined, law is
essentially instrumentalist in character. It serves as an expression of the
king's (and thereafter the parliamentary) will. It is fundamentally
administrative in character (understood in the modem French or German
sense), though it is expressed in the forms of statute. It corresponds
roughly to the measures whose transformation into law was so derided
by Carl Schmitt 23 in his attacks on Weimar constitutionalism.2 4 There is
a residue of this notion still in the differentiation within French
constitutional law, between the idea of lois, the province of the nation
expressed through its Assembly, and reglement, which under Article 37
of the French Constitution are within the power of the executive
authority.25 And this division has been urged as a basis for global
governance.26
The space within which gubernaculum operates is broad but not
Mo. Press 2006).
19. See GROSSI, supra note 13.
20. CHARLES MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, ANCIENT AND MODERN (Cornell U.
Press, rev. ed. 1947).
21. Id. at 77.
22. Id. at 82-83.
23. See SCHMITT, supra note 5.
24. Id. at 68-74, 97-98.
25. 1958 CONST. art. 37 (Fr.). On the differences between Anglo-American and
French regulatory system theories, see Peter Lindseth, The Paradox of Parliamentary
Supremacy: Delegation, Democracy, and Dictatorship in Germany and France, 1920s-
1950s, 113 YALE L.J. 1341 (2004).
26. See Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and
Values, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 187, 192-95 (2006).
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unlimited. The absolute authority of gubernaculum, was limited by
jurisdictio, understood as a "higher," or in modem terms, constitutional
law. This higher law described rights, whose breach was beyond the
power of government. These rights were not inherently instrumental,
that is proceeding from a conscious act of government. They were
positive, organic and limiting principles.
Definitions of "right,". . . share the character of the immemorial
custom they define, and these, Bracton says, "since they have been
approved by the consent of those using them and confirmed by the
oath of kings, can neither be changed nor destroyed without the
common consent of all those with whom counsel and consent they
have been promulgated."
27
Government, within its sphere, had the absolute power to act, through
administrative orders (in statutory or other form). But the rights of the
political community, expressed in its organic privileges and customs,
acquired a life of their own, unmoored from the state or the governance
rights of the monarch. In the aggregate, these rights served as a body of
law, an expression of an autonomous power of the political community
against its governing apparatus (traditionally in the person of the
monarch). 28  "When King John substituted his will for the law, in
proceeding against vassals whose wrong had not been judicially proved,
civil war and the Great Charter were the result., 29 Gubernaculum had no
power over jurisdictio, but was required to act within its normative
limits. These limits eventually would be expressed through the courts, in
its current form as judicial review. Originally it was expressed through
assertions of rights by royal vassals, and in the extreme, for example in
the 1 3 th , and 1 7 th centuries in England, and in the 1 8 th century in the
American colonies, as revolution. Law, in this sense, is not instrumental,
but is "positive and coercive, and a royal act beyond those bounds is
ultra vires."
30
This understanding of the separation of law from government, of the
state from the system of rules that bind the apparatus of the state, was
popularized within the English elites through Sir John Fortescue's
treatise on the Governance of England.31 Fortescue carried forward
Bracton's notions of a law existing as a limiting power beyond the
government's, "formed by the rights of his subjects which the king has
sworn to maintain, and which he cannot lawfully change or blemish or
27. MCILWAIN, supra note 20, at 83.
28. WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 252-56 (2d ed. 1923).
29. MCILWAIN, supra note 20, at 86.
30. Id. at 85.
31. CoRWIN, supra note 12, at 35-38.
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arbitrarily transfer from one to another." 32 These traditional notions of
law reified asjurisdictio found its most influential modem expression in
England during the reigns of the early Stuarts.33 In Sir Edward Coke's
writings, it also served as a great basis for American constitutionalism.
Coke was widely known in the colonies. His work, especially on
property, though expensive, was often a prized part of personal law
libraries in the American colonies.34 And the views he expressed were in
sympathy with colonizing communities, especially north of the Potomac
River.
One of the most influential expressions of the idea of law as an
entity separate from government is found in Coke's report of Dr.
Bonham's Case (1610).35 The case related to the power of the College of
Physicians to regulate the medical trade in London. With respect to the
extent of Parliament's power to grant a concession against common law,
Coke reported:
And it appeareth in our Books, that in many Cases, the Common law
doth controll Acts of Parliament, and sometimes shall adjudge them
to be void: for when an Act of Parliament is against Common right
and reason, or repugnant or impossible to be performed, the Common
law will controll it, and adjudge such Act to be void.3 6
To a great degree, law was meant to protect against the inclusions of
power by setting up another power, beyond the reach of an individual,
even the holder of governmental authority. It fractured power and set its
mechanisms beyond the reach of the sovereign.
Law stood as the thing through which a system of opposing
power-entrusted to and managed by a large class of well-socialized
acolytes (the bar)---could resist the power of the state to coerce behavior.
As Mary Sarah Bilder suggests:
Although during the seventeenth century, Coke and then Hale would
develop increasingly elaborate understandings of the common law,
the common law remained a system in which pleas to the judiciary
required addressing "reason"-"the faculty acquired by training that
extracted some workable rules from a formless body of immemorial
32. MCILWAIN, supra note 20, at 88.
33. SIR THOMAS SMITH, THE MANNER OF GOVERNMENT OR POLICIE OF THE REALME
OF ENGLAND (London, Henrie Midleton 1583).
34. Mary Sarah Bilder, The Lost Lawyers: Early American Legal Literates and
Transatlantic Legal Culture, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 47, 88 (1999) (Coke's writings on
property were especially sought-after).
35. Dr. Bonham's Case, (1610) Eng. Rep. vol. 8, 113 b (8 Co. 107a), reprinted in
EDWARD COKE, THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF SIR EDWARD COKE, vol. 1, 264 (Steve
Sheppard ed., Liberty Fund 2003).
36. Id. at 275.
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knowledge"--not appealing for what any ordinary person could
claim was justice, equity, or mercy.37
Thus, the law was intolerant of the notion that a monarch had the power
to personally decide cases at common law. Corwin well recounts this
idea in action in the famous confrontation between Coke and James I at
Hampton Court on November 10, 1608, in which the judges of the Realm
sought to resist the notion that James, as King, had authority to decide
cases at common law in his own person.38 Responding to the idea that
reason alone was sufficient to apply the law, Coke responded that:
causes which concern the life, or inheritance or goods, or fortunes of
his subjects, are not to be decided by natural reason, but by the
artificial reason and judgment of the law which law is an act which
requires long study and experience before a man can attain to the
cognizance of it.
39
James well understood the implication-the King himself was under law.
This, James thought, "should be treason to affirm,, 40 to which Coke
responded with Bracton's words: "Quod Rex non debet esse sub homine,
sed sub Deo et lege" ("The King ought not to be subject to man, but
subject to God and to the law"). 4' Of course, Coke meant to twist the
meaning of Bracton, who wrote at a time in which the law proceeded
from God through His Church. For Bracton, all authority may have
derived from law, but law derived from God as Logos. With this
conflation it was an easy matter (and no treason) to place King under
law: that is, under God. A King acting solely on the basis of the
authority of his own will acted as a mere man, like any other. Critically
for Coke, the Divine connection was not relevant to make the statement
true. Now it was common law asjus, not proceeding from the divine that
served the purpose of differentiating between lex and homine.
This understanding of law contributed eventually to the production
of a doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy under law. Law was
understood to exist to some extent beyond the State, though capable of
modification (in part) through it.42 Law was both the expression of
power (in terms of ordering behavior), and also opposed to power (in
terms of resisting assertions by individuals or institutions to order
behavior ultra vires). Under this conception of law, government (and the
37. Mary Sarah Bilder, The Origin of Appeal in America, 48 HASTINGS L. J. 913,
925-26 (1997).
38. CORWIN, supra note 12, at 38-39.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 39.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 57.
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state) is viewed as fiduciary in nature. Its power is derivative and
limited. It is thus a partial rather than a total power to order behavior.
Government (first King, then King in Parliament, then Parliament alone)
might ultimately express law as a conscious and positive act. But
Government can never be law, nor reduce law to an instrument of
governmental will. In this sense law remains an "other" to government,
that is, a thing in a very real sense. It may not be delegated,43 nor may it
be reduced to an instrumental character. The "community perpetually
retains a supreme power of saving themselves from the attempts and
designs of anybody, even their legislators, whenever they shall be so
foolish or so wicked as to lay and carry on designs against the liberties
and properties of the subject." 4  Law, like God, remains outside the
reach of individuals, or the people, but moves with them, and serves to
protect them from themselves in a complicated conversation.45
But, law also constituted its own point of resistance. "[T]here are
no relations of power without resistances; the latter are all the more real
and effective because they are formed right at the point where relations
of power are exercised., 46 Law here retains its composition as thing, but
now it is a thing whose purpose is to serve as instrument of the very
power it appeared to resist, and managed for this purpose by the same
large class of well-socialized acolytes. Thus, Francis Bacon reminds us
in oft quoted language that:
Judges ought to remember that their office is jus dicere, and not jus
dare; to interpret law, and not to make law, or give law; else it would
be like the authority claimed by the Church of Rome, which, under
pretext of exposition of Scripture, doth not stick to add and alter, and
to pronounce that which they do not find, and, by show of antiquity,
to introduce novelty.
47
Judges, like law, assume an instrumental character. "Let judges also
remember that Solomon's throne was supported by lions on both sides;
let them be lions, but yet lions under the throne, being circumspect that
they do not check or oppose any points of sovereignty.
'
"
48
This also found an odd reflection in the American colonies. Mary
Sarah Bilder reminds us of the strong colonial embrace of equity,
43. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT ch. 11, 183 et seq.
(Oxford, Penguin Classics 1964) (1690).
44. Id. at ch. 19, 224 et seq.
45. CORWIN, supra note 12, at 68-69.
46. MICHEL FOUCAULT, Powers and Strategies, in PowERKNOWLEDGE: SELECTED
INTERVIEWS & OTHER WRITINGS, 1972-77, 134 & 142 (Colin Gordon, ed. and trans., New
York, Pantheon Books 1980).
47. BACON, supra note 4, at 221.
48. Id. at 230 (footnote omitted).
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founded in part on an appeal to authority beyond the narrowness of law,
bound up in the development of appeal.49
The system that the colonists adopted and adapted contained a
substantive theory of justice that differed from the rule of law. Their
belief in the importance of equity from an accepted hierarchical
political authority led them to create a new culture of appeal. The
new culture ironically was based on a procedural device that was
linked to institutions they despised (Rome, the Pope, ecclesiastical
courts, the king), but with a set of meanings that held forth a promise
of justice nonexistent in England.5
Bacon and Coke represented the jurisprudential opposing poles of what
would eventually require violent resolution in the English Civil War,
which greatly influenced the development of American legal culture. As
Kevin Philips explains in a remarkable study of the socio-religious and
cultural connections between the English Civil War, the American
Revolutionary War and the American Civil War, the "English Civil War
is the necessary starting point ... where the events and alignments
leading up to the American Revolution began. The latter was really a
second English-speaking civil war, drawing many of its issues,
antagonisms, and divisions from the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
British Isles."'" Philips argues that the pattern of rebellion and loyalty in
those conflicts "leads to religion. 52 And the road from theology to law
and politics is broad and direct, especially before the nineteenth
century.
53
This idea of theology creating a path to law and politics
reconstitutes itself in Hobbes, and the beginning of a "positivist" school
of jurisprudence in which government is conceived as the monopoly
holder of legitimate power. All other forms of its expression are
marginalized and subordinated:
Those that speak of this subject, confoundjus and lex, right and law,
but they ought to be distinguished. RIGHT, consisteth in liberty to do
or to forbear; whereas LAW, determineth, and binds people to do or to
forbear. Law and right differ as much as do obligation and liberty,
which are inconsistent when applied to the same thing.54
This, of course, is one of the bases not of eighteenth century, but of
49. See Bilder, supra note 37.
50. Id. at 967.
51. KEVIN PHILLIPS, THE COUSINS' WARS: RELIGION, POLITICS, AND THE TRIUMPH OF
ANGLO-AMERICA xx (Basic Books 1999)
52. Id. at xxi.
53. Id. at 516-22.
54. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 86 (Pearson Longman 2008) (1651).
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twentieth century American notions of law and its relationship to the
state. In the early nineteenth century, Justice Marshall famously
explained American political theory as grounded in a division of
governmental authority in which the whole of the legislative power was
vested in the Congress.5 5 However, Justice Marshall did not suggest that
law was merely the instrument through which this whole of the
legislative power was exercised, that is that law was mere servant of
legislator who otherwise acted unbounded. By the end of that century
though, Americans had come to believe, as Thomas Paine has suggested
at the time of the founding of the Republic, 56 that the extent of the law
was co-extensive with the power to legislate, and that indeed, that law
did not exist except as a concession of the legislator, or more generally
the people constituted as a legislative body.
Thus, the nineteenth century witnessed a great reconstitution of the
relationship between gubernaculum and jurisdictio. By century's end,
jurisdictio had become something more like modem constitutionalism,
conceptually less organic than medieval notions of constitutional custom
(consuetudo) and more directly bound up within sovereign positivism
(the right of the people to reconstitute themselves through acts of
political will). These are notions indirectly expressed in English
constitutionalism57  and more directly expressed in American
constitutionalism. In the Weimar Constitution and the French
constitutions, of course, the positivist notion completely overcomes
consuetude: the people, constituted in a national assembly become the
living embodiment of right. And, in modem constitutionalism,
gubernaculum becomes the sole space within which jurisdictio can be
asserted.58
In common law jurisdictions, the relationship between law and
power, or more precisely, between law and the state, become
increasingly conflated from the nineteenth century. And in the
conflation, the relationship between them becomes multiple and inverted.
The absolutism embedded in the administrative gubernaculum is
extended to jurisdictio, and jurisdictio becomes an instrument of
gubernaculum. The template is set in the seventeenth century in the
55. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
56. See Thomas Paine, The Rights of Man, in COMMON SENSE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN
AND OTHER ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE, Part II (New York, Signet Classics
2003) (1792).
57. A.V. DICEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
3-35 (8th ed. 1915).
58. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (W. Rumble ed.,
Cambridge, Cambridge U. Press 1995) (1832); JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON
JURISPRUDENCE, OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW, two vols. (4th ed.) (R. Campbell,
ed., London, John Murray 1879, reprinted in Bristol, Thoemmes Press 2002).
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debate between Coke and Bacon. Mcllwain nicely expresses this insight:
In the seventeenth century, the royalists, citing the undoubted
precedents for absolutism in government alone, extended those
without warrant into the sphere of mere jurisdiction; while the
parliamentarians, seeing the limits of the medieval jurisdictio, with
equal lack ofjustification, applied these to acts of government as well
as to the definitions of right.
From the eighteenth to the end of the nineteenth century everywhere,
though to the greatest extent in France:
Law was an effective instrument for the constitution of monarchical
forms of power in Europe, and political thought was ordered for
centuries around the problem of Sovereignty and its rights.
Moreover, law.., was a weapon of the struggle against the same
monarchical power which had initially made use of it to impose itself.
Finally, law was the principle mode of representation of power.
The scientism of law, especially as articulated in the nineteenth century
by English thinkers uncomfortable with the protean ambiguity of custom,
paralleled the rationalization of all human relations that was perhaps the
greatest legacy of the Enlightenment. "For Bentham and Austin, the law
was, indeed, capable of being a rational science.,,61 Rationalization of
the common law had been in the air among elites since the end of the
Napoleonic Wars with Bentham's suggestions to that effect. 62 As Alcott
nicely summarizes:
What came to be called Austinian legal positivism was thus the
means by which the general cultural phenomenon of positivism was
allowed vestigially to affect the minds of lawyers. Law could be
explained without reference to the extra-legal, the mysterious, the
ideal or the moral. The Austinian orthodoxy was also prophetic, as
the partly reformed parliament (after 1832) became, or came to seem
to be, the engine for revolutionary transformation of British society.
63
In the United States, this march toward scientism affected everything in
law. For example, legal education was rationalized in the nineteenth
century, joining other academic disciplines in the University where its
disciples have worked for over a century to make a science of the law.
64
59. MCILWAIN, supra note 20, at 86.
60. FOUCAULT, supra note 46, at 140-41.
61. PHILIP ALCOTT, THE HEALTH OF NATIONS: SOCIETY AND LAW BEYOND THE STATE
47 (Cambridge, Cambridge U. Press 2002).
62. JEREMY BENTHAM, CODIFICATION PROPOSAL (London, J. M'Creery 1822).
63. ALcoTT, supra note 61.
64. See WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN
AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION 29-38, 122-32 (New York, Oxford U. Press 1994).
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This scientism has affected the way in which the law is used to
rationalize and model human behavior as well, especially in American
criminal law. 65  Contemporary Americans were no less willing to
abandon the unruliness of Coke and custom for Bacon, hierarchy, and
rationality. Codification of the common law had been in the air since at
least the time of Justice Joseph Story.66 That work continues in the bar,
through the century of legal rationalization of the common law.
67
Entities like the American Law Institute continue the work of
conversion of the common law into something like an Imperial Roman
Codex. The American Law Institute ("ALl"), building on the
"Bractonian and Blackstonian treatises, declaring the common law on the
empirical foundations of judicial decisions, 68 fearing the "chaos in a
legal world of 48 states"'69 but afraid to undertake legislative codification,
invented the form of the Restatement. Restatements constituted a
synthesis of sorts, "analytical, critical and constructive,, 70 seeking to
reduce to a single systematic form the underlying principles that gave a
legal field coherence "and thus restore the coherence of the common law
as properly apprehended., 71  They serve once to synthesize and to
innovate.72 Though not binding, ALl Restatements have proven to be
authoritative in many American courts.
French constitutionalism from the time of their eighteenth century
revolution expressed well this new relationship of law to state. Law was
a function of will expressed through the nation, and it was the nation,
rather than law, that was reified, in the French case, in the form of the
assembled and legitimate representatives of the nation.73  These
65. See Larry CatA Backer, Emasculated Men, Effeminate Law in the United States,
Zimbabwe and Malaysia, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2005).
66. See Joseph Story, Codification of the Common Law, in THE MISCELLANEOUS
WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 702 (William W. Story, ed., Boston 1852) (1837); William P.
LaPiana, Swift v. Tyson and the Brooding Omnipresence in the Sky: An Investigation of
the Idea of Law in Antebellum America, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 771, 775-76 (1986).
67. See FRANK GAHAN, THE CODIFICATION OF LAW (London, Grotius Society 1923).
68. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, CAPTURING THE VOICE OF THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE: A HANDBOOK FOR ALI REPORTERS AND THOSE WHO REVIEW THEIR WORK vii
(Philadelphia, American Law Institute 2005).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 5.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Thus, with respect to what was to become the Code Napoleon, the process of
national transformation of the old customary law systems that constituted French law
proceeded from the state. "In 1792, the Convention appointed a drafting committee,
which made rapid progress and produced a plan for a Code of 779 Articles. In 1796, a
new plan for a Code of 1,104 Articles was produced. In all, five plans were discussed
before the final Code was begun in 1800." F.M.H. MARKHAM, NAPOLEON AND THE
AWAKENING OF EUROPE 57 (London, English U. Press 1954).
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assembled representatives together constituted as the nation-another
reification. Thus reified, this aggregation served to give concrete form to
that abstraction, the state. So manifested, the state could express its will
as law, and thus, express the state as a unitary community.7 4 The Code
Napolron thus proceeded from the nation, as an act of wholly contained
sovereign will. 75 Yet the Code Napoleon expressed not merely internal,
but also external will. "In one aspect of his imperial policy Napoleon
was consistent-the introduction of the Code Napoleon into the annexed
territories and vassal states. The Code was the container in which the
principles of the French Revolution were carried throughout Western
Europe, even as far as Illyria and Poland. ' '76 Thus, the set of assumptions
that shaped the legal culture producing the Code Napoleon also produced
the set of assumptions necessary to use that Code (and others like it from
other states) as part of the European imperial projects of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries.
Here one encounters a sort of reification inverted. The
objectification is not systemic-there is no intangible but compelling
body of law independent of the state apparatus, there are only intangible
instruments of the national will whose physical expression is written rule
proceeding from the lawgiver. It did not exist outside the state; its
objectification was instrumental and dependant on government. This is
law as technique, assuming a form generalized as the disciplines by
Foucault almost two centuries later.77 And it fit nicely into developing
European notions that conflated ethnos, demos, state and government.
Thus, for example, Savigny, in a way that was no longer remarkable by
the nineteenth century, could articulate a systemic theoretics grounded in
the idea that every people constitutes a state. "By transcending the
distinction between people and state, Savigny makes it possible to think
of private law as the emanation of the people's spirit (Volksgeist), and
still conceptualize private international law as a system of conflicts
between state laws. 78 For these theorists, of whom Savigny serves as a
great early example, it became an object of faith that "just as the people
74. In 1789, there was nothing approaching a state of legal unity of the French
nation. There were no less than 366 local Codes in force, and a fundamental division
between north and south. In the south, property rights were based on written Roman law,
the Code of Justinian; in the north, on Teutonic customary law. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 115.
77. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOL. I: AN INTRODUCTION
(Robert Hurley trans., 1978) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY].
78. Ralf Michaels, Globalizing Savigny: The State in Savigny's Private International
Law and the Challenge of Europeanization and Globalization (Duke Law School
Working Paper/Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 15, 2005), at 12, available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/duke/fs/papers/l 5. (footnote omitted) (last visited Dec. 28, 2007).
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only attain reality through the state, so the people's (private) law
becomes law only through the state. 79
The reification of ethnos through law as opposed to the reification
of law through demos continues to drive important areas of continental
law making. It has proven important in the development of European
constitutional theory in the context of the construction of that great
supra-national entity, the European Union. This conceptualization of law
as an expression of ethno-reification through state formation was nicely
expressed, for example, by the German Federal Constitutional Court in
considering the character of the European Union within German
constitutionalism.
80
Democracy, if not to remain a formal principle of accountability, it is
dependent upon the existence of specific privileged conditions, such
as ongoing free interaction of social forces, interests and ideas, in the
course of which political objectives are goals also clarified and
modified and as a result of which public opinion moulds political
policy. For this to be achieved, it is essential that both the decision-
making process amongst those institutions which implement
sovereign power and the political objectives in each case should be
clear and comprehensible to all, and also that the enfranchised citizen
should be able to use its own language in communicating with the
sovereign power to which he is subject.... [A]ctual conditions of
this kind may be developed in the course of time, within the
institutional framework of the European Union.
8 1
State and government nicely reify people (as ethnos) through the
mechanics of law that serves the ultimate purpose of preserving the
autonomy of every ethnos. "Each of the peoples of the individual States
is the starting point for a state power relating to that people. 82 The state
then serves as source and limit of law. "The States need sufficiently
important spheres of activity of their own in which the people of each
can develop and articulate itself in a process of political will-formation
which it legitimates and controls" '83 through an instrumentalist law, "in
order thus to give legal expression to what binds the people together (to a
greater or lesser degree of homogeneity) spiritually, socially and
politically. 84
79. Id. at 11 (footnote omitted).
80. Bundesvergassungsgericht [BVerfG] [federal constitutional court] 1993, 89
Entscheideungen des Bundesverfassungsrichts [BVerfGE] 155 (F.R.G.) (commonly
known in the English speaking world as Brunner v. European Union or the German
Maastricht decision).
81. Id. 41-42.
82. Id. 44.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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Napol6on, and his successors (especially though by no means
limited to the great nineteenth century German theorists) marked the end
of a long period of development of customary and positive law not
centered on the state8 5 Roman law, for example, even as a sort of set of
general principles, became formally fractured and incorporated within
the ethnic genius of the law codes of European tribes now organized as
fully formed Westphalian states. But even on the Continent, the
medieval notions of custom and constitutions guaranteed to political
subdivisions (the "ancient rights") survived in some form. They remain
a potent force to this day in places like Catalunya, whose twenty-first
century struggle for autonomy is based on a political program to
vindicate its fourteenth century rights derived from, and confirmed by,
the Crown.86
Carl Schmitt captures well the Continental suspicion of approaches
to law whose legitimacy and content was to some extent beyond the
control of government. Marginalized as mere "custom" "its actual
polemical-political significance was determined through the opposition
against the legislative right of the absolutist Monarchs .... [T]he
recognition of customary law always means a limitation on the
parliamentary lawmaker to the benefit of other [state] organs, especially,
of course, the judiciary.' 87 This strongly echoes Coke and places a
modem, state centered gloss on law as the reified "other," separate from
the state and its apparatus. Of course, this was the worst of all worlds for
theorists like Schmitt, as well as for the great legal system builders of the
nineteenth century in Europe, from those who crafted the Code
Napoleon, to nineteenth century German law theorists busy creating a
normative foundation for the construction of the Reich and the
expression of its genius in law, the great Birgerliches Gesetzbuch, the
85. See GROSSI, supra note 13.
86. Spanish foral law, like French customary law, has been at the center of a struggle
between a centralizing monarchy and aristocratic local governments. Monopolistic
positivism, centered on the person of the monarch was meant to serve as a basis for
reducing the power of the older local aristocracy, which relied on its rights, derived from
custom, to resist royal power. On the Code Napoleon and the consolidation of the French
state and French law, see text at notes 72-74, supra. On Spanish foral law, see, e.g., J.H.
ELLIOTT, THE REVOLT OF THE CATALANS: A STUDY IN THE DECLINE OF SPAIN, 1598-1640,
17, 118, 206 & 255 (1984).
The king's powers in the States of the Crown of Aragon for the administering
of justice, the exacting of tributes or the raising of armies were hedged about
with legal restrictions. At every turn, a ruler would find himself limited by the
fueros, the laws and liberties he had sworn to observe, and each of the
territories possessed a standing body, like the Catalan Diputaci6, whose
specific function was to defend the national liberties against the arbitrary power
of the Crown.
Id. at 7.
87. SCHMITr, supra note 5, at 17-18.
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German civil code.8 s For the great state builders of the nineteenth
century, from Hamilton and Thomas Paine in the United States, to the
state builders all across Europe, and ultimately the builders of totalitarian
state regimes in Europe in the early twentieth century,
[t]he images of legal science and legal practice were (and still
certainly are) mastered by a series of simple equivalences. Law =
statute; statute = the state regulation that comes about with the
participation of the representative assembly. Practically speaking,
that is what is meant by law when one demanded the "rule of law"
and the "principle of the legali of all state action" as the defining
characteristic of the Rechtsstaat. 
9
The positivist basic norm posits the "congruence of law and statute. The
state is law in statutory form; law in statutory form is the state.... There
is only legality, not authority or commands from above."9°
In the twentieth century, the spirit of Francis Bacon, now
rationalized as a "social science," was strongly felt, but within an altered
landscape of law and government. By mid century, among many
influential circles of the Western elite, law was displaced by politics; the
focus on the formal elements of systems was displaced by the substantive
analysis of power. In the United States, the so-called pragmatists and
even more ironically misnamed "legal realists" sought to reduce common
law notions to a caricature of its system despised by civil lawyers.
Justice Scalia has been among the most astute advocates of
positivist instrumentalism of the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries. For Scalia an autonomous reified law disappeared at the same
time that the common law was replaced in the United States by notions
of democratic constitutionalism. Scalia's boldest pronouncement in this
regard could not be clearer and is worth quoting. Referring to
autonomous systems of law based on a common law framework whose
autonomy was protected by an independent judiciary, Scalia writes: that
such a legal system in the United States "is now barely extant, the system
that Holmes wrote about: the common law. That was a system in which
there was little legislation, and in which judges created the law of crimes,
of torts, of agency, of contracts, of property, of family and inheritance." 91
92Sounding very much like a legal realist, with strong Nietzschean roots,
88. See generally FRIEDRICH VON SAVIGNY, supra note 3.
89. SCHMITr,supra note 5,at 18.
90. Id.
91. Antonin Scalia, Book Review (reviewing STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY
(Harvard U. Press 2005)), 157 FIRST THINGS 37-46 (Nov. 2005), available at
http://www.firstthings.com/article.php3?id-article=245&var-recherche=Steven+Smith+
%22Law%27s+Quandry%22.
92. See Larry CatA Backer, Retaining Judicial Authority: A Preliminary Inquiry on
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Scalia inverts cause and effect to construct an explanation for this.
And just as theories such as the Divine Right of Kings were
necessary to justify the power of monarchs to make law through
edicts, some theory was necessary to justify the power of judges (as
agents of the King) to make law through common-law adjudication.
That theory was the "brooding omnipresence" of an unwritten law
that the judges merely "discovered. '" 93
But, Scalia argues all that has changed now. In place of both the
King (undeniably overthrown in the American revolution) and the
brooding omnipresence, the Americans have taken on a new golden calf.
Presto! Just at the moment that the American colonies organized to form
a true common law republic, something magical happened, the
substitution of a reified idea, democracy for the old body of the King.
But democracy has overtaken all that. Modem governments, or
modem governments in the West at least, are thought to derive their
authority from the consent of the governed, and the laws they
prescribe are enacted by the people's representatives. Such a system
is quite incompatible with the making (or the "finding") of law by
judges-and most especially by unelected judges.94
For Scalia, democratic theory occupies the same place as the theory of
the legal effect of the "royal will" occupied for Francis Bacon in Stuart
England. In both cases, a view of law as existing outside the power of
gubernaculum was inconceivable. In both cases, jurisdictio outside
gubernaculum was viewed as subterfuge-the necessary post hoc
theorizing of a group seeking to retain power for itself under a system in
which such power grabs was inconsistent with the theory of
gubernaculum, and therefore inconsistent with its jurisdictio. We are as
far away from our founding roots as we can get-and according to
Justice Scalia all is necessary in the name of our founding roots. Scalia
thus carries forward, in a very illuminating way, the extremist rhetorical
style of the eve of the English civil war, and he takes up the cause of the
initial loser in that battle.95
In the Soviet Union (and its satellites) and later in the People's
Republic of China, realism of a different sort prevailed, that of the
Marxist-Leninist insight of the conflation of state-law-power and Party.
Theorists in Europe, and then the United States, refined and combined
the insights of legal realism and Marxism, in a number of politico-
the Dominion of Judges, 12 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 117 (2003).
93. Scalia, supra note 91.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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theoretical movements usefully understood as post-modernism. For our
purposes, all of these movements had one important characteristic in
common-they all sought to embrace, in one form or another the
reduction of law to little more than a means by which power is
authoritatively communicated. There is only authority and it commands
from above. Law is their instrument or the veil through which power is
imposed. The only important question for law, then, was its utility in
expressing political ideology.
96
But the reification of law as instrument, a commonplace by the end
of the twentieth century, in turn produced its own sources of resistance.97
One source was reactionary-a return to reification of law through
religious normative systems, the same basis of law that Bracton would
have understood. In the United States, this reactionary turn has its own
instrumentalist turn, much of its progress has been won through a
revivified Religion Clause jurisprudence. Another source is post-
modern, seeking universal norms within a global human common law
edifice created either through emerging international institutions (human
rights universalism) or in private law 98 or in combinations of both.99
Both are discussed below.
Another inversion of sorts was noticeable by the end of the century.
Substituted for a system based on the centrality of "Law-and-
Sovereign,"100 was one of force relations through which the mechanism
of power can be more usefully examined.101  But this power was
essentially instrumental as well-a tool without a master, and without a
purpose except as expressed in the aggregate by the consequences of its
use. "The omnipresence of power: not because it has the privilege of
consolidating everything under its invincible unity, but because it is
produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every
relation from one point to another." 10 2  Power, thus understood, is
exercised and not possessed. It is immanent in all relationships,
96. See Larry Cat6 Backer, The Rule of Law, The Chinese Communist Party, and
Ideological Campaigns: Sange Daibiao (the "Three Represents'), Socialist Rule of Law,
and Modern Chinese Constitutionalism, 16(1) J. TRANSNAT'L LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
29 (2006).
97. See STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY (Harvard U. Press 2005); BRIAN Z.
TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW (Cambridge U.
Press 2005).
98. See Catd Backer, supra note 8.
99. See Larry Catd Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The
United Nation 's Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a
Harbinger of Corporate Social Responsibility as International Law, 37 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 287 (2006) [hereinafter Catd Backer, Multinational Corporations].
100. FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 77, at 97.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 93.
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whatever the formal methodologies of expression of those relationships.
It comes from below. It is rational and intentional, "the rationality of
power is characterized by tactics that are often quite explicit at the
restricted level where they are inscribed."1°3 And it engenders its own
resistance. 10 4  To use more traditional language, systems of power
express the common practices of the people; "[m]ajor dominations are
the hegemonic effects that are sustained by all these confrontations" of
force relations. 105
Ironically, there is a strong echo of Coke's understanding of
common law in Foucault's characterization of power. Just as Coke
proposed the common law, a passive bottom up aggregating force,
against the conscious law-as-state-instrumentalism of James I, so
Foucault posits a similarly constituted concept-"power"-against the
positivist instrumentalism of consciously created top down control
systems. What can be more Coke-like than an assertion that "[b]y
power, I do not mean "Power" as a group of institutions and mechanisms
that ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given state"? 0 6 Except
that for Foucault, power has no master-no systems of acolytes charged
with its preservation and interpretation. Foucault offers us power/law in
the form of an uncontrollable pantheism as an alternative to Coke's
institutionalist model. Yet both models posit the importance of an
executive authority in the state; Foucault as an increasing anachronism in
the face of the disciplinary power of totalitarian technologically driven
governance, and Coke as a monarch whose principal obligation is to keep
the peace within the scope of his prerogatives.
The study of law as politics, and politics as power, tends to focus on
Marxist-Leninist regimes. And indeed, Marxist-Leninist regimes,
through the end of the twentieth century inverted the relationship of law
and politics, and centered all power on the state (or more precisely on the
Communist Party and the vanguard of the new order). 0 7 But it cannot be
forgotten that modem fascism shares a similar view of the relationship of
law to power. Mussolini suggested that:
[t]the nation is created by the State, which gives the people,
conscious of their own moral unity, the will, and thereby an effective
existence. The right of a nation to its independence is derived not
from a literary and ideal consciousness of its own existence, much
103. Id. at 95.
104. Id. at 94-95.
105. FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 77, at 94.
106. Id.
107. See Larry CatA Backer, Cuban Corporate Governance at the Crossroads: Cuban
Marxism, Private Economic Collectives, and Free Market Globalism, 14 J. TRANSNAT'L
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 337 (2004).
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less from a defacto situation more or less inert and unconscious, but
from an active consciousness, from an active political will disposed
to demonstrate in its right; that is to say, a kind of State already in its
pride (in fieri). The State, in fact, as a universal ethical will, is the
creator of right.1
0 8
One of his theorists, Alfredo Rocco, suggested a concession theory of
law and right, reflecting the institutionalist and corporatist mentality of
fascism, and its obsession with reification.
Our concept of liberty is that the individual must be allowed to
develop his personality on behalf of the state, for these ephemeral and
infinitesimal elements of the complex and permanent life of society
determined by their normal growth the development of the state....
Freedom therefore is due to the citizen and to classes on condition
that they exercise it in the interest of society as a whole and within
the limits set by social exigencies, liberty being, like any other
individual right, a concession of the state. What I say concerning
civil liberties applies to economic freedom as well.
10 9
Even current systems of globalization, in their national and trans-
border organization, appear to substitute power, and power relations-
that is governance and regulation-for law and government. The only
difference, perhaps, is the substitution of an institutionalized "system"
for state, and "rule" for "law." 110
It has no others. It arouses disparities, it solicits divergences,
multiculturalism is agreeable to it but under the condition of an
agreement concerning the rules of disagreement .... These rules
determine the elements that are allowed and the operations permitted
for every domain. The object of the game is always to win. Within
the framework of these rules, freedom of strategy is left entirely
open. It is forbidden to kill one's adversary.
111
Yet there are similarities with more traditional approaches. It found
expression in the eighteenth century in the work of Jean Jacques
108. Benito Mussolini, The Conception of the State, in The Doctrine of Fascism:
Fundamental Ideas, in READINGS ON FASCISM AND NATIONAL SOCIALISM, 10 (Alan
Swallow ed., Project Gutenberg 2004), (reprinted with permission from I.S. MUNRO,
FASCISM TO WORLD-POWER (I.S. Munro ed. & trans., Alexander Maclehose 1933)),
available at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/14058/14058-h/14058-h.htm#THE_
DOCTRINE OFFASCISM (last visited Dec. 27, 2007).
109. Alfredo Rocco, The Problems of Liberty, of Government, and of Social Justice in
the Political Doctrine of Fascism, in The Political Doctrine of Fascism, in READINGS ON
FASCISM AND NATIONAL SOCIALISM (Alan Swallow ed., Project Gutenberg 2004).
110. JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, POSTMODERN FABLES (Georges Van Den Abbeele
trans., U. of Minn. Press 1997).
111. Id. at 199-200.
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Rousseau: "Were there a people of gods, their government would be
democratic. So perfect a government is not for men. ' 12  Law for
Rousseau was also essentially instrumental and partial. It serves
increasingly as the conceptual framework from which both totalitarian
and democratic governance in the West are grounded. Law becomes
more and more the codification of power. It need not have a particular
character. There are echoes of this in pre-Second World War German
notions of Rechtsstaadt, 1 3 and its transmogrification in the theories of
Carl Schmitt.1 14 But it also bears fruit in that most liberal of all twentieth
century republics, the United States, especially in the post-Second World
War American ideas of process constitutionalism.' 15  Indeed, the so-
called "countermajoritarian difficulty" that has enthralled several
generations of American legal and academic elites,1 16 and that has served
as the basis for a campaign to scare the electorate about the power of the
judiciary,' 17 reduces itself to a twentieth century version of the perhaps
more elegantly proffered argument of Francis Bacon. Bickel and his
disciples in their turn, like Francis Bacon before him, argued that lawyers
and the courts ought to exercise their authority under the authority of the
sovereign. 118 For Bacon, that sovereign took the form of the King, for
Bickel, that sovereign was the "people" through their elected
representatives to which popular authority had been transferred.1 19 In
both cases, they move far from that other great legal tradition, still
vibrant at the time of the founding of the American Republic-that
understood law as organic and the sovereign power as principally
executive in nature.120
Like its eighteenth and nineteenth century counterparts, the newer
approaches tend to view law as instrumental, though instrumental in a
different sense. That difference, in part, reflects the possibilities for the
112. Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right, Bk.
III, pt. 4, in 38 THE GREAT BOOKS 387, 411 (G.D.H. Cole trans., 1762).
113. See Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional
Democracy, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1307, 1318 (2001).
114. See SCHMIrT, supra note 5, at 18.
115. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 88-103 (Harvard U. Press 1980).
116. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (Bobbs-Merrill 1962).
117. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW (Free Press 1990).
118. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS
(Harper & Row 1978) (1970).
119. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (Yale U. Press 1975)
[hereinafter BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT].
120. This was the case either under Bodin's reading of sovereignty, or Coke's
common law version in which the lawyer class stood as a bulwark against executive
intrusion in the law (at least the higher law) of the Kingdom. See BODIN, supra note 2, at
Bk. IV, ch. III, 123-27; COKE, supra note 35, at vol. 1.
[Vol. 26:3
REIFYING LAW
assertion of newer techniques of power made possible by advances in the
technologies of control. The centrality of law-and the state-is
substantially weakened once one eliminates the ideas that the state is the
supreme repository of power with a monopoly over the institution of
power as law, and that law proceeds in specific form solely from the acts
of political communities. 121 Consequently, it has been fashionable to
speak of law as an instrument of power, as its mask. 122 "Law is neither
the truth of power nor its alibi. It is an instrument of power which is at
once complex and partial."' 123 In its twentieth century mode, "power is
tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its
success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms.', 124 And
so it appeared to function effectively in this way in both the democratic
West and the totalitarian East. For both societies, law served as the veil
behind which the panoptic state could be constructed-providing a
regularity and formal legitimacy to many of its techniques, while
deflecting the extent of their insinuation in the social order. And
Western scholars have devoted substantial energy to unmasking law in
the service of this or that system of subordination or more generally of its
intensification of force relations of any kind.
Foucault did not live long enough to understand the way in which
he both served to describe an epoch about to end and to point the way to
that epoch's reconstitution. We have come to live in an age in which the
form of "law with its effects of prohibition needs to be resituated among
a number of other, non-juridical mechanisms."' 125 We are in a position
now to better understand Foucault's assertion that:
If it is true that the juridical system was useful for representing, albeit
in a nonexhaustive way, a power that was centered primarily around
deduction (prjlvement) and death, it is utterly incongruous with the
new methods of power whose operation is not ensured by right but by
technique, not by law but by normalization, not by punishment but by
control, methods that are employed on all levels and in forms that go
beyond the state and its apparatus.
26
Today, power applied systems of force relations, have taken up a thread
of Foucault's discourse of law/power. I want to explore the great shift
from the post-modern-with its obsession with power and its techniques,
with subordination and its abolition-to an age in which the techniques
121. See FOUCAULT, supra note 46, at 140.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 141.
124. FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 77, at 86.
125. FOUCAULT, supra note 46, at 141.
126. FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 77, at 89.
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of power have been deployed in the service of management. We live in
Foucault's asylum: "to effect moral syntheses, assuring an ethical
continuity between the world of madness and the world of reason, but by
practicing a social segregation that would guarantee bourgeois morality,
a universality of fact, and permit it to be imposed as a law upon all forms
of insanity. 1 27 We live in the age of true disciplinary power, power
"exercised through its invisibility; at the same time it imposes on those
whom it subjects a principle of compulsory visibility."' 2 8 The only
marker of these disciplines in law, now put to another use-a post-
monarchical use, in which we are all subject to the disciplinary
machines. Thus, we live in a world, not of a singular hierarchy of
disciplinary machines,129 but one in which there are multiple
simultaneously functioning and imperfectly horizontally integrated
pyramidal organizations producing power and distributing individuals
(and other organizations) "in this permanent and continuous field.' 130
What are the characteristics of law in this new age of management?
What are the techniques of its power/knowledge? To what extent are the
techniques of this new age explained through law? I will attempt to
extract some answers through an examination of law as technique among
transnational actors and God as law within emerging modem traditions
of state-based constitutionalism. In this extraction I remain aware that
"[i]nstitutional legal history abounds with crooked and confused paths
forced unnaturally straight by previous generations of scholars whose
vested interest in preserving the rule of law extended to rewriting the
past. Accepting an illogicality about institutional development, we might
follow a few paths to their cultural complexity."'
' 31
III. Law as Technique: The Management Networks of Power at the
International Global Level and the Reconstitution of Legal
Reification in Global Common Law
To speak in terms of disciplinary power-to speak in terms of
techniques of control-is to look to rising systems of behavior
management that increasingly characterize the organization of social and
economic communities operating autonomously on a global scale. We
127. MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE
AGE OF REASON 259 (Richard Howard trans., Vintage Books 1965) [hereinafter
FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION].
128. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 187 (Alan
Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 1977) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH].
129. FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION, supra note 127, at 177.
130. Id.
131. Bilder, supra note 37, at 968.
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move from the state to systems, to networks of power relationships. 132 It
is only in the early twenty-first century that power, as Foucault
understood the term, has unmasked itself. But in a world of force
relations, of techniques of control and management, has law become a
marginal element? Rather than recede, what we find is that law was
redefined itself to suit the needs of a new set of power relationships.
These relationships point to global post-nationalism as an organizational
focus.' 33 Thus naturalized, it survives in a new world order.
This construction of a global system of private law making is
spearheaded by an important group of large multinational corporations.
It is rising in the shadow of, and parallel with, less successful attempts by
national and international bodies to develop a system of public law rules
to govern multinational behavior. It is now readily apparent in the
construction of webs of contractual relationships between multinational
corporations and their global networks of suppliers, usually factories
located in the developing world and retail operations worldwide. This
modem global law making relies on the participation of key elements of
civil society to help determine the content of these provisions and to act
as monitors of supplier conduct. It also relies on the participation of
media, both to publicize breaches of conduct norms by suppliers and the
efforts of multinationals to correct these breaches. This global system of
supplier agreements evidences how large multinational corporations,
elements of civil society and the media, increasingly perform powerful
quasi-governmental roles, roles encouraged by the human rights
establishment in Geneva and loathed by most Western states, at least as
official policy.
134
The characteristics of this emerging system are substantially
different from the traditional public law based system derived from the
activities of political communities.135 The system is based on private law
making. Though in this case, private law forms mask the public law
character of the system. 36  This system consists of four principal
132. Gunther Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centered
Constitutional Theory, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 3-28
(Christian Joerges, Inger-Johane Sand & Gunther Teubner eds., Oxford & Portland,
Oregon, Hart Publishing 2004).
133. See, e.g., Neil Walker, The EU and the WTO: Constitutionalism in a New Key, in
THE EU AND THE WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 31 (Grdinne de Burca &
Joanne Scott eds., Hart Publishing 2001).
134. See CatA Backer, Multinational Corporations, supra note 99.
135. For the traditional division between public and private law spheres, see GERALD
TURKEL, DIVIDING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE: LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIAL THEORY (Praeger
Publishers 1992) ("Law constitutes core relations through which the public/private
division is recreated in agents of social action at the same time that it is being socialized
at deeper structural levels."). Id. at 227.
136. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 127 (W.D. HallsGeorge
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participants: corporations and other enterprises, non-governmental
organizations, the media (news, information, and advertising), and
individuals acting as consumers of the products offered by the other three
actors (goods, services, investments, or information and the markets
through which these objects are consumed). These actors have interests,
albeit fundamentally adverse interests, yet are dependent on each other.
That adverse interest dependency is deepened in a system that increases
the authority and legitimacy of each of the actors through their
regularized interactions. Together, these actors produce a complete
system of regulation, from legislation to enforcement, that are focused
and limited in scope but dynamic and effective within its limits and
growing. Within these systems, grounded in the relationships in
individual TNCs with NGO, media, customer and investor communities,
the role of the state and other public bodies becomes secondary rather
than primary, and it becomes difficult to determine, at the international
level, whether law is being sourced from consensus in private behavior
or legal norms developed through the deliberative political process. 137
An incident reported in 2006 by the British Broadcasting Company
("BBC") on its web site provides context. 138 The BBC reported on what
might have appeared to be a curious series of events. It explained how a
human rights NGO working in China discovered allegations of
substandard working conditions for Chinese workers at one of Apple's
iPod factories in China. 139 These allegations were reported in English
newspapers and the story was eventually picked up by the BBC. In
response, Apple immediately affirmed its obligation to ensure
appropriate working conditions for workers in its supplier's factories in
China and that it would investigate the allegations and correct
deficiencies in the factory. 140 Eventually, Apple released a report of its
investigation and remedial measures.
141
Simpson trans., New York, Free Press 1864).
In order to completely separate the two sorts of law, it would be necessary to
admit that there is really a private law, whereas we believe that all law is
public, because all law is social. All the functions of society are social, as all
the functions of the organism are organic.
Id.
137. See Catd Backer, supra note 8.
138. See British Broadcasting Corporation, iPod Slave Claims Investigated, BBC
NEWS (UK VERSION), Business, June 14, 2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/
business/5079590.stm (last visited Dec. 27, 2007).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See Apple, Inc., "Report on iPod Manufacturing" (Aug. 17, 2006), available at
http://www.apple.com/invesTor/ (follow "Responsible Supplier Management" hyperlink;
then follow "iPod Manufacturing Report" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 27, 2007)
[hereinafter Apple, Report on iPod].
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There are several points to this story that make it interesting from
the perspective of law and power. First, Apple had adopted a code of
conduct that essentially exports a set of behavioral norms onto its
suppliers. 42 That code forms part of the contractual relations between
Apple and its suppliers, giving Apple a substantial amount of regulatory
control over the way in which suppliers operate. Though the supplier
code appears targeted to its suppliers, it actually is meant to induce an
appropriate response from its investors (the consumption of its shares
and other investment instruments). Apple thus targets communication of
this information to its investor community in a way that has a set of very
specific objectives other than governance. 143 It explains that "Apple is
committed to ensuring that working conditions in Apple's supply chain
are safe, that workers are treated with respect and dignity, and that
manufacturing processes are environmentally responsible.' 44  The
Supplier Code itself is also available not only to affected suppliers but
also to the investment and consumer communities. 45 The code itself is
interesting. It is based on a model code prepared by the relevant industry
group (this comes as no surprise), but it also incorporates certain
international human rights and labor norms.
Apple's Supplier Code of Conduct is modelled on and contains
language from the Electronic Industry Code of Conduct. Recognized
standards such as International Labour Organization Standards (ILO),
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Social
Accountability International (SAI), and the Ethical Trading Initiative
(ETI) were used as references in preparing this Code and may be
useful sources of additional information. A complete list of
references is provided at the end of the Code. 1
46
Second, Apple's reaction to reports of the story of sub-standard wages
was positive. It did not deny the allegations, it did not lash out at the
monitors who brought the story to the press. Instead, it reaffirmed its
commitment to its behavioral norms as set forth in its voluntary code,
and promised an investigation of the allegations. 147 Third, Apple worked
diligently to investigate and produce a report that was broadly distributed
142. See Apple, Inc., "Supplier Code of Conduct" (Nov. 13, 2005), available at
http://www.apple.com/investor/ (follow "Responsible Supplier Management" hyperlink;
then follow "Supplier Code of Conduct" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 27, 2007)
[hereinafter Apple, Supplier Code of Conduct].
143. See Apple, Report on iPod, supra note 142.
144. Apple, Supplier Code of Conduct, supra note 143, at.
145. See id.
146. See Apple, Inc., "Supplier Code of Conduct," supra note 142.
147. See Apple, Report on iPod, supra note 142.
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to its consumers and the investment community. 148 Fourth, elements of
civil society played a key role in monitoring Apple's Supplier Code of
Conduct. It was a Chinese human rights organization that did the work
to uncover and report allegations of substandard conditions-that is of
conditions that violated the Apple Supplier Agreement. Fifth, the media
played a critical role in conveying information in a way that legitimated
it. Sixth, the state played little if any role in this event. Apple stands at
the center of a network of relations that produce behavioral norms that
acquire an existence separate and apart from the state. 149 This is coercion
aimed to manage behavior.
But where is law as traditionally understood, within these networks
of relations? Law assumes a more traditional role, not as positive
pronouncement but as framework principles applied as the situation
demands. Law resides at the margins of this system. Power is diffuse
and pervasive. It is now a function of relationships and norms set forth
in contract. But contracts are rarely the subject of litigation under this
system. Instead, contracts form the basis through which relations (and
behavior) are managed. For example, when Wal-Mart learned that its
suppliers in Jordan might be violating both Jordanian labor law and
international human rights norms, they sent auditors to the company,
they reviewed behavior, they met with factory managers, they withheld
payment pending changes in behavior tied to the set of contractually
based norms that guided the relationship between Wal-Mart and the
supplier, and then Wal-Mart recertified a supplier whose behavior now
better conformed to norms systems acceptable to Wal-Mart. There was
no litigation; there was no appeal to state authorities. There was an
interaction between the multinational, supplier, the NGO community and
the media. 5 0
Law here exists apart from its objects. It has been stripped of the
juridical patina that Foucault thought was its most marked characteristic.
It is also law that again exists outside the usual abode of power,
traditionally understood as political power. But power is no longer
expressed as politics. It speaks the language of economics; Marxist-
Leninists should see the irony. Private lawmaking networks at the trans-
border level appear to revive Coke's notions of the separation of
common law from government, yet also in a dynamic relation with it.'1
Foucault was right to broaden our understanding of law/power. The
system of corporate private law making is the essence of the force
148. Id.
149. See Teubner, supra note 131.
150. These relationships are elaborated in Catd Backer, supra note 8.
151. See Teubner, supra note 132.
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relations of power he describes: a "network of power relations...
forming a dense web that passes through apparatuses and institutions,
without being exactly localized in them."'1 52 But he missed the essential
nature of authority in the mix. And for authority some form of legal
reification remains essential. Lyotard perhaps had it right when he
described the authority/law matrix:
In the modem system, and even more so in the postmodem one,
authority is a matter for argument. It is never attributed, or conceded,
so to speak, to an individual or a group, which may occupy the
location of authority only for a limited time. That location is, in
principle, empty. Authority is designated by a contract, even if it is
the final word in which the Law itself speaks.
153
Thus, in this global system is evidenced a new law/power relationship.
But the law/power relationship being constructed outside of the formal
structures of traditional public law shares a certain similarity to law in its
pre-Enlightenment forms. It harkens more to Coke than to Bacon, more
to Locke than to Schmitt. The new law/power matrix is custom and
practice backed by social and economic power. The example of Apple
related above evidences the way in which the disciplines, as understood
by Foucault in the context of the erection of a surveillance society,
154
have become dynamic forces in the reconstruction of systems of
law/power. 155 But it also demonstrates that even the most dynamic and
subterranean of forces cannot resist reification. It might surprise
Foucault to see that even the disciplines can serve as a "common law" to
be deployed against state and individual actors seeking to impose their
will against normative principles the disciplines further.
IV. God as Law; Humanity as Law: Divergence in the Management of
State Power in Modem Constitutionalism
Yet even as power is increasingly exercised as technique beyond the
traditional understanding of law as "thing," traditional uses of law as an
instrument of asserting the power supremacy of the state continue to
flourish in modem form. Foucault surely rejects this constitutionalism as
an act of delusion-for him law cannot but be partial and legal discourse
misdirected. It is to the techniques, to the disciplines, the underground
152. FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 77, at 96.
153. LYOTARD, supra note 110, at 77.
154. See FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 128, at 187.
155. The relationship of law/power systems, surveillance and governance are
explored in Larry Catd Backer, Global Panopticism: Surveillance Lawmaking by
Corporations, States, and Other Entities, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming
2008).
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structure of behavioral compulsions that he looks. And yet law can
reconstitute itself, and in the reconstitution, attempt to broaden its
purported reach to the limits of human understanding. Bombast? No,
rather a sign of law folding back on itself as an expressive device-as the
Logos, the manifestation of an aspect of the universality of humankind or
God.156 Law thus becomes the tip of an iceberg-a tool of ideology, or
more generally, an expression of the disciplines through which human
norms become action. But even the tip of the iceberg Foucault rejects
has a point. And in the twenty-first century the point has been
sharpened, taking three primary forms: first, traditional self-contained
systems of legal hierarchies, second, legal hierarchies limited by the
great principles of international behavior norms; and third, legal
hierarchies subordinate to a higher law represented by the
pronouncements of organized religion of one form or another.
A. Traditional Self-Contained Systems of Legal Hierarchies
Modem constructions of the American, French and English
constitutions are the best examples. These are constitutions that by their
terms represent the highest possible legitimate law making power, but
which themselves remain subordinate to the active will of the sovereign
power (usually, but not always, the people). Constitutions in this sense
are law deeply embedded within the framework of the state and its own
conception of itself. This is law as Bacon and Hobbes (along with Tom
Paine) understood it-law as essentially instrumental and bounded by the
will of the legislator. It is the legitimate language of political power by
those with the authority to wield it. Its only borders are those embraced
by the lawgiver. And these borders may be changed af any time. Just as
the United States abandoned slavery in the nineteenth century, it could
again impose the practice in the twenty-first. Just as France emancipated
her Jews in the nineteenth century, it might undo that emancipation in the
twenty-first, by rejecting all prior acts as inconsistent with the current
will of the lawmaker. This is a legal theory that, in its pure form,
156. These ideas are explored in more detail in Larry Cata Backer, Fides et Ratio:
Religion and Law in Legal Orders Suffused by Faith, in LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY,
July 30, 2007, available at http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com./2007_07-01-archive.html
(last visited Dec. 28, 2007).
Self-constituted communities are bounded by the Truth of their constitution, a
truth that necessarily embodies faith and reason in the sense that Benedict
describes. Political communities like religious and social communities, are
bounded by the Truth of their constitution-rationally bounded by rules and
understandings within which the infinite is possible. Faith provides the
ongoing principles of that community-its morals, ethics and theology. Reason
serves as the means to incorporation and application of those principles.
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democrats and Marxist-Leninists might applaud-but in defense of very
different conceptual frameworks.In the United States, expression of an
instrumentalist reification of law has provided the essential framework
for the great debates of American constitutional theory. Bickel's
majoritarian difficulty 57 and Weschler's neutral principles 58 are natural
expressions of the idea that even foundational law is an object of
positivist manipulation. Each works to justify a judicial role in a
normative system of legal instrumentalism.' 59 This justification assumed
critical importance especially as it related to a judicial system designed
to operate under a normative conception of law as autonomous rather
than instrumental. Weschler and Bickel express the efforts, in the
American context, to reconstitute the American judiciary on the Stuart
model, as "lions, but yet lions under the throne, being circumspect that
they do not check or oppose any points of sovereignty.,,160 Bacon, of
course, would understand the conceptual difficulties of judicial review of
legislative or executive action; Coke would not. Where law is reified as
autonomous and systemic, rather than instrumental and consequential,
the difficulties of judicial review, even within democratic theory, tend to
fall away.
Likewise, the American presidents' repeated attempts at early Stuart
type rule-President Truman with the steel mill seizures161 and President
George W. Bush with the detention of American citizens during combat
operations' 62 -show the power of this sort of instrumentalism in action.
In both cases there was a clash of legal culture. On the one hand, the
idea of law as the servant of state power and, on the other, the idea of law
as an autonomous set of normative limits of state power. Ironically, in
both cases, the judiciary tended to push very little beyond a core
instrumentalism tied to a positivist conception of the American
Constitution.
These limitations were nicely illustrated in the various opinions in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 163 on the president's power to establish military
commissions. The opinion provided an opportunity to refine the great
debate between constitutional structuralists, political constitutionalists
and ideological supremacists. These three great schools of normative
constitutionalism in the United States reflect the tensions in American
157. See BICKEL, supra note 116.
158. See Herbert Weschler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959).
159. See Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 112 YALE L. J. 153 (2002).
160. BACON, supra note 4, at 230.
161. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
162. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
163. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
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legal thought between law as conceived by Coke and as articulated by
Bacon. Constitutional structuralists assert that the Constitution is the
sole source power, positive and negative, applicable to political actors,
and that the function of the Supreme Court is to apply those limits, and
only those limits. Political constitutionalists believe the Constitution
creates a flexible matrix for governance that ought to be molded to
political necessity and applied by the political branches without
substantial judicial interference. The wild cards in the mix are
ideological supremacists. For them the key is natural law, theology or a
global common law of human rights and governance behaviors.
Constitutional structuralism is... the view adopted by the Hamden
majority. Political constitutionalists [include] ... the view adopted at
least in the dissent of Justice Alito. Ideological supremacists believe
that the Constitution was written to serve higher moral, ethical or
ideological purposes, though there is little agreement among groups
of ideological supremacists over which set of ideologies the
Constitution serves. For them, the Constitution must be bent in the
service of these higher causes by the Courts or by any other
institution necessary for that purpose. This is the view that most
clearly comes out in Justice Thomas's dissent, and much more subtly
in the dissent of Justice Scalia.
164
The first two views are substantially instrumentalist, based on the idea of
positively managed structural limits on governmental power. The last
suggests legal autonomy, but of a kind that might implicate a different
sort of instrumentalism-a religious or moral one, discussed in the next
section.
It is against the limitlessness of this instrumentalist rule of law that
Brian Tamanaha centers his critique from a secular perspective.
165
Tamanaha points to the importance of autonomy. Steven Smith,
following a similar path but from a religious perspective, also is
uncomfortable with an instrumentalist reification of law.' 66 Smith, in
particular, is sensitive to the tensions in modem American
jurisprudence-a jurisprudence in which both Coke's autonomous law
and Bacon's instrumentalist law exist simultaneously. Smith argues that
"[s]ince at least the time of Holmes, lawyers and legal thinkers have
scoffed at the notion that "the law" exists in any substantial sense or that
it is not reducible into our discourse and practices. Law is not a
164. Larry Catd Backer, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: Some Preliminary Thoughts on a
Conservative Opinion, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY, July 1, 2006, available at
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com (last visited Dec. 28, 2007).
165. See TAMANAHA, supra note 97.
166. See SMITH, supra note 97.
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"brooding omnipresence in the sky." 167 Smith argues that the rejection of
the ancient notion of an organic and autonomous law (including a
binding "higher law") arises from what he describes as a correct
perception "that our ontological inventories (or at least those that prevail
in most public and academic settings) could not provide any intelligible
account of ... this preexisting thing called 'The Law."" 68 However,
Smith argues that though our heads may tell us that law is at best an
instrumental reification, our hearts still belong to the more ancient
English conception.
At the same time ... [there is] cogent evidence suggesting that we
still do believe in "the law".... Our actual practices seem
pervasively to presuppose some such law: our practices at least
potentially might make sense on the assumption that such a law
exists, and they look puzzling or awkward or embarrassing without
the assumption."
' 169
And perversely, these criticisms mirror, in some respects the criticisms of
Western law through the critical legal studies movement and its various
offshoots.
B. Legal Hierarchies Limited by the Great Principles of International
Behavior Norms
The creation of "higher law" restraints on government finds parallel
development in the efforts to create a higher law of nations after 1945.
These efforts bore fruit in the great exercises in constitution making after
the Second World War, from the German and Japanese post-war
constitutions to South Africa's post-apartheid constitution at the close of
the twentieth century. These constitutions still adhere to the hierarchies
of the traditional constitutions. Each acknowledges that there are some
choices that the state cannot write into law. And some provide that
certain restraints may not be erased from the domestic constitutional
order. 170 But these restraints are derived from a different normative legal
order. This set of boundaries beyond the law making power of the state
are not found in some law that is separate from, but at the same level as
the state law of constitutions. Instead, the boundaries are impermeable
because they derive from consensus at a level higher than the state-as
part of a consensus among the community of nations. 171  This new
transnational or post-national constitutionalism is the hallmark not only
167. Id. at 62.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 63.
170. For the provision in the German Basic Law, see GG art. 79.
171. See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST. 1996, art. 39, pmbl.
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of modem national constitutions, but also of new supra-national
constitutional orders, such as the European Union. 
172
These global higher law restraints emerge, in the first instance, from
the communal traditions of the community of state's themselves. It
shares aspects of both higher common law (the norms reflect the shared
mores of the community, its lived reality and shared vision of itself in its
highest aspirational form) and natural law (the norms represent the only
or "best" expression of human values). These traditions become
authoritative when expressed in their ideal form-as an expression of
their highest communal aspirational views of themselves, as civilized,
advanced, and normatively perfect states. These traditions point to a set
of moral and ethical behavior rules thought generally to apply to all
civilized states. These rules then serve as the basis for a global
framework of higher law.
These norms become law when deliberately adopted as binding
international norms by the collective family of nations through their
global institutions. The U.N., in particular, has served as the great source
of the communal civilizer of states through international law now
limiting constitutions. 173 For the most part, global consensus, among the
community of nations has focused, since 1945, on what is commonly
referred to as "human-rights universalism."' 174  Thus, for example,
because the international community has arrived at a consensus,
expressed in positive international law through binding conventions, that
slavery violates all acceptable behavioral norms, slavery may not be
incorporated into the constitutional system of a sovereign political
community, even one in which a majority of whose members are
otherwise willing.
Law in this context appears reified in two perhaps surprising ways.
First, law again assumes a character as a thing separate from the state-a
body of consensus among the community of states-a common law of
humanity. The irony here is that this traditional form of reification, now
centered at a level above the state, exists in a system in which the
governments on which this form of human rights universalism is
imposed embrace, as a matter of national law, the notion of the identity
of law and government. Coke's notion has moved beyond the state to a
172. See Marlene Wind, The European Union As A Polycentric Polity: Returning To
A Neo-Medieval Europe?, in EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND THE STATE 103 (J.
H. H. Weiler & Marlene Wind eds., Cambridge U. Press 2003).
173. Cf MARTII KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND
FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1870-1960 (Cambridge U. Press 2002).
174. Harold Honhju Koh, Luncheon Address, reprinted in The American Law
Institute Remarks and Addresses at the 83rd Annual Meeting, 83 A.L.I. PROC. 70 (May 17,
2006), at 70.
[Vol. 26:3
REIFYING LAW
global stage. At this level, higher law, as global consensus, can exist
without challenge from states. But this is a more deliberative law system
than that conceived by Coke. As Jill Frank nicely expressed in her
consideration of Aristotle on constitutionalism, "[d]eliberative democrats
tend to treat the constitution as a rule of right reason and to reify and
freeze it by locating it out of time, in an invariable realm that transcends
human affairs."
'17 5
But this reification of law as autonomous is itself a positivist
exercise. In this context, law is reified in a different sense, as an
instrument-serving to provide the framework within which political
communities may authoritatively act through law while permitting states
to retain a monopoly of legislative power within their territories. Thus,
law retains its positivist and instrumental character within a state, even as
it loses that character in the construction and interpretation of the "higher
law" of the state-its constitution. With respect to this higher law, law
understood in its global context as a common higher law, stands separate
from and beyond the authority of any state legislature, and even the
sovereign authority of the people. Thus, the limiting framework was
external to any individual state constitutional system. It was secular. It
could be changed but only by the consensus of the community of nations.
That separateness is not guarded by a cohort of common law
lawyers, as on Coke's world, but by a group of what Peter Fitzpatrick
calls "deific substitutes"'' 76 who reify global constitution limits "by
treating it as a 'dead' rule for the future, a fact of social acceptance."
177
Thus, global common law acquires form only through positive acts
expressing a deliberate consensus among the community of states. Law
in this sense is a self-immanent expression of the members of the global
common law community, and thus authoritative as an aggregate
expression of that unity.171
C. Legal Hierarchies Subordinate to a Higher Law Represented by the
Pronouncements of One or Another Organized Religion
These are the great theocratic states, from Iran to Iraq and
Afghanistan. Law stands apart from the state, but is merely the
instrumental form of higher law. It takes a middle place between human
power and divine command. Law is reified, to be sure. But it is both
175. Jill Frank, Aristotle on Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law, 8 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES IN LAW 37, 49 (2007).
176. Peter Fitzpatrick, What Are the Gods to Us Now?: Secular Theology and the
Modernity of Law, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 161, 178 (2007).
177. Frank, supra note 175, at 49.
178. Fitzpatrick, supra note 176, at 178.
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thing (a reflection of the substance of the Divine voice in human affairs)
and instrument (the means through which obedience to this voice may be
compelled). Thus, for example, consider the relationship between law
and the divine in a system in which the constitution provides that all
international human rights conventions are to be incorporated as
domestic law and also provides that all law or constitutional provisions
must be consistent with the rules, morals and ethics of an identified
religion, which is also thus incorporated into domestic law. In a system
of this kind it is more than likely that the doctors of the law will be
required to consult with their effective superiors, the doctors of the
church to interpret constitutional provisions. 79 This notion served as the
legal bedrock on which the Afghani government was required to proceed
in an action against a Muslim convert to Christianity.18  Law is thus an
instrument of Divine will (that which proceeds from the mouth of God)
and the Divine will itself (is God).'18  People who have the ear of God
hold the key to the transmission of law to his servants in government.
Nietzsche, though highly critical, perhaps understood it best:
[I]n Paul the priest wanted power once again-he could use only
concepts, doctrines, symbols with which one tyrannizes masses and
forms herds. What was the one thing that Mohammed later borrowed
from Christianity? Paul's invention, his means to priestly tyranny, to
herd formation: the faith in immortality-that is, the doctrine of the
'judgment."1 82
179. IRAQI CONSTITUTION 2005, art. 21, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wpdyn/content/article/2005/1 0/12/AR2005101201450.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2007).
180. See Larry Cati Backer, Constitution and Apostasy in Afghanistan, LAW AT THE
END OF THE DAY, Mar. 28, 2006, available at http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com (last
visited Dec. 28, 2007) ("In applying the law, the courts, including the Supreme Court, is
obligated to apply the interpretations of a particular jurisprudential school of Islamic
Shar'ia to decide questions of law.").
Article 131 of the Afghani Constitution (Chapter 7, article 15) provides that:
[w]hile processing the cases, the courts apply the provisions of this Constitution
and other laws. When there is no provision in the Constitution or other laws
regarding ruling on an issue, the courts' decisions shall be within the limits of
this Constitution in accord with the Hanafi jurisprudence [one of the traditional
schools of Islamic jurisprudence] and in a way to serve justice in the best
possible manner.
Id. In that case, the courts avoided a confrontation with the West over the issue by
returning the matter to prosecutors on procedural grounds. "Suggesting both procedural
defects and the sense that only mental illness could explain apostasy (conversion from
Islam to Christianity), the courts returned the case to prosecutors." Id.
181. In the more traditional formulation perhaps better understood in the West: "In
the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God; and the Word was God. ....
All things were made through him and without him was made nothing that has been
made." John 1:1-1:3.
182. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Antichrist, in THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE, 42 (Walter
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Using the legal systems language of the present we come back to a
time before Coke. We can take Kant literally now in this context when
he suggested the connection between the genius of human striving for
perfection and a higher law "so holy (inviolable) that it is already a crime
even to call it in doubt [which must be thought] as if it must have arisen
not from human beings but from some highest, flawless lawgiver; and
that is what the saying 'All authority is from God' means."'183 Kant
meant to celebrate the divine essence of collective humanity. But in
place of a perfectible Enlightenment humanity this system understands
perfectibility literally as God, understood as Logos.184 Law is reified as
an emanation of the divine presence in human affairs. The separation of
human gubernaculum and jurisdictio is a necessary requirement in a
world in which God and law are one which is served by humanity
through its governance apparatus.
In the West, this form of legal reification takes a distinctly
Christological form-as Logos and Church. 185 And in this sense law is
again reified, as against the state, in the sense Bracton understood that
reification, not as Coke and Locke later understood it. In Islam, the
reification follows a different path-through the Qu'ran and the
ummah. 186 In either case, Law is reified as both standing as a thing apart
from people and their social organizations (Law is God, or God is Law),
and constituting the divine source within humanity (Logos as reason) 187
and the ummah as Law in Islam.
188
These systems appear as assertions of complete power through legal
Kaufmann trans., New York, Viking Press 1968) (1888).
183. EMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 6:319 (Mary Gregor trans.,
Cambridge U. Press 1996) (1797).
184. See Larry Catd Backer, The Mechanics of Perfection: Philosophy, Theology and
the Perfection ofAmerican Law, in ON PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICAN LAW (Francis J. Mootz,
Jr., ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2009).
185. For a fine but controversial exposition, see Benedict XVI, Faith, Reason And
The University, Apostolic Journey Of His Holiness Benedict XVI, To Miinchen, Alt6tting
And Regensburg (Sept. 9-14, 2006), Meeting With The Representatives Of Science,
Lecture Of The Holy Father, Aula Magna Of The University Of Regensburg, Tues., Sept.
12, 2006, available at http://www.vatican.va/holy~jather/benedict-xvi/speeches/2006/
september/documentsihf ben-xvi-spe 20060912_.university-regensburgen.html
(provisional text, Sept. 16, 2006) (last visited Dec. 28, 2007).
186. Christopher Stewart, From "Mother of the World" to the "Third World" and
Back Again: The Harmonization Cycle Between Islam and the Global Economy, in
HARMONIZING LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION: CONVERGENCE, DIVERGENCE, AND
RESISTANCE 279, 282-85 (Larry CatA Backer ed., Carolina Academic Press 2007).
187. See Benedict XVI, "Faith Reason and the University: Memories and
Reflections," Address Delivered at the University of Regensburg, Germany, Sept. 12,
2006, available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/benedict-xvi/speeches/2006/
september/documents/hf ben-xvi spe_20060912_university-regensburg-en.html.
188. See RODOLPHE J.A. DE SEIFE, THE SHAR'IA: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
ISLAM 34 (Austin & Winfield 1994).
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ordering, expressed in a written constitution. And indeed, they can be
considered complete within their spheres of authority.' 89  But those
spheres are themselves severely limited by territory or the community of
believers. State power loses legitimacy and authority beyond the borders
of a state. Where power is based on a relationship to a divinity as
lawgiver, God's power loses force beyond the community of believers.
The Muslim ummah has little authority over the community of Shinto.
Yet, like "the voice heard long ago by Abraham and Mohammed, the
voice of the muezzin echoes through the cities and the deserts to remind
all that there is no authority in human affairs other than the Law
proclaimed by that voice." ' 90
V. Implications
And so we arrive where we started. Or better put, we have moved
from Foucault's unifying matrixes of power/disciplines underlying
juridical law to Lyotard's "system" of post-modern politics. 91
"Postmodern politics are managerial strategies, its wars, police
actions.... As for the legitimacy of the system, it consists in its ability
to self-construct."'' 92 And thus, law is reified again, both as a thing apart
from the authoritative institutional repositories of power, and as an
instrument of that institutional power repository. But law now includes
the disciplines; it has moved beyond the confines of government. The
state, and the positive law it purports to produce, is a subset of a broader
understanding of law as power/discipline-as the trivia of managing
individuals, entities, religions, and ultimately, the state. Law serves
those communities for whose benefit, or management or perfectibility, it
is deployed. Law continues to construct itself, to suit the situation, or the
tastes around which consensus on the nature of its reification are
developed, sustained, modified and abandoned in favor of another. Law
is particularly suited to management in the post-modem. Law is both
system and discipline/technique of power in the current order.
Law remains as indeterminate a force in the twenty-first century as
it was in the seventeenth century in England and the United States.
Whatever the ultimate truth of the nature of law, its reality among
communities of believers has been both mutable and unstable. Law
constitutes both subject and verb, a thing and a tool. It constitutes the
state and it remains something apart from the state. What four hundred
189. See Inger-Johanne Sand, Polycontextuality as an Alternative to
Constitutionalism, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 41-65
(Christian Joerges, Inger-Johane Sand & Gunther Teubner eds., Hart Publishing 2004).
190. LYOTARD, supra note 110, at 77.
191. Id. at 199-216.
192. Id. at 200.
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years of debate seems to confirm is only this: law is a powerful totem for
belief systems. Control of the meaning of law is among the greatest
techniques of power. On one side are those who would resist invasion of
ancient or traditional rights by increasingly powerful and aggressive
institutional bodies-government, religion, corporation, and society.
The source of resistance is the sure belief in the power of an autonomous
reified complex of law. On the other side are those institutions, which
conceive themselves as representatives of the whole or complete parts of
the power of those they represent. Convinced of the perfection of the
authority derived from such representation, these institutions resist the
imposition of checks and restraints applied in new and more restrictive
ways. The source of this resistance is the sure knowledge that law is
separately constituted but is passive and instrumental, to be used by
legitimate authority in the construction and articulation of normative
standards that exist apart from law and subordinate to the genius of the
political community. And perhaps, both the struggle and its inevitable
frustration, more than anything else, illuminates the autonomy, the
distinct personalities, of law reified, as the great insight for the twenty-
first century.
Ironically, while Foucault is immeasurably important in helping
understand the dynamics of this relationship, Foucault himself was too
much in the contest for control. As a consequence, his analysis may
suffer from the same partial quality as the law systems he critiques. But
his insights are sound. Foucault is right to assert that power is both
partial and fractured among all actors among whom power is deployed.
Power can be reified as law, or can use law as an instrument of
naturalizing power. The partial nature of power is reflected in law to the
extent that law itself is connected with power. But law itself can exist in
all areas in which power is deployed. It is independent of the state, at
least in the sense that as the state cannot contain power, even within its
borders, neither can it contain law. And the nature of law, like the nature
of power, is bounded. But the bindings are constructed. They reflect the
willingness of actors affected within networks of power, to believe in the
limits of power/law, and to act within those limits.
Thus, one ends where modernity began-with faith as the basic
ordering principle of power. 93 Law must be "more than the positive law
derived from statutes and any rules able to be discovered in judicial
decisions."'1 94  The fundamental relationship of power comes around
193. See Larry Catd Backer, The Mechanics of Perfection: Philosophy, Theology and
the Perfection ofAmerican Law, in ON PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICAN LAW (Francis J. Mootz,
Jr. ed., Cambridge, Cambridge U. Press forthcoming 2009).
194. Sian Elias, Address, reprinted in The American Law Institute, Remarks and
Addresses at the 8 4 h Annual Meeting, 84 A.L.I. PROC. 67, 78 (May 16, 2007) ("Law
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again to a balancing of faith and law-or perhaps more ironically put,
between faith and reason,' 95 or in its equally antique forms, between
jurisdictio and gubernaculum.196 Even overlaid with the protection of a
caste of lawyers charged with its maintenance, the separation is at once
tangible and intangible, and moral as against a usurping individual
force. 197 It assumes a moral dimension even in secular states. 198 In its
more secular form, the reification of law, as corpus or instrument, as
outside or as within the state and its apparatus, continues as the great
battleground of "politics now as it has been in all past ages. The two
fundamental correlative elements of constitutionalism for which all
lovers of liberty must yet fight are the legal limits of arbitrary power and
a complete political responsibility of government to the governed." 199
The expression of that law-the sources of power and its arbitrary
exercise--changes. The methodologies of power relations may be vested
within juridical, political or other power communities. Law can break
the boundaries of its traditional confines as the technologies and
expressions of political organization change. Communities move from
Logos, to custom, to state, to non-state communities, to the community
of nations or humanity as Logos expressed as global custom, a
reinvention of jus gentium, or Logos over humanity expressed as reason
or command. Each of these foundations produce a distinct system in
which the character of law, and the relation of law to the basic
substantive organizing principles of the political community, changes to
reflect that relationship. Law is understood differently, sometimes
radically so, within theocratic, secular, customary, supra-national and
global communities.
The constitutional deadlock of seventeenth century England, now
responds to a deeply held ethical need."). Quoting in part Lord Radcliffe, New Zealand
Chief Justice Elias explained:
[t]hat if law means little more than the "vast and complicated mass of things [a
citizen] is compellable to do or not do by virtue of some Act of Parliament or
some other order or regulation," then people will adhere to it only for the
purely practical purpose of keeping out of trouble. If that is so, he said,
"[S]omething has gone wrong. Some clue has been lost."
Id.
195. See BODIN, supra note 2, at Bk. I, ch. I. For its expression in Catholic doctrine,
see John Paul II, Encyclical Fides et Ratio (Sept. 14, 1998), available at
http://www.vatican.va/edocs/ENG0216/INDEX.HTM (last visited Dec. 28, 2007).
196. See Corwin, supra note 12.
197. In its seventeenth century incarnation, as I have suggested, an incarnation with
deep roots in the United States, see COKE, supra note 35, at vol. 1.
198. See, e.g., BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT, supra note 119, at 104. For its
application in the context of the debate over same sex marriage, see, e.g., Larry CatA
Backer, Religion and the Discursive Language of Same Sex Marriage, 30 CAP. U. LAW L.
REV. 221 (2002).
199. MCILWA1N, supra note 20, at 146.
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broadened and freed of the artificial boundaries between public and
private law, reproduces itself on a global level in the twenty-first century.
On the one hand are the difficulties of applying law to states themselves.
When states seek to engage in activities as private actors, law assumes a
different character. The traditional boundaries between public and
private law are weakened and its instrumental character might require
redefinition. z0 On the other is the rise of governance systems in which
law, as a formally constituted expression of political power, is absent.2 °1
Struggles for control of law as a normative construct will be the
great battleground for theory and practice in this century. None will win.
All will attempt to work within networks of private and public power that
emerges as institutions and political communities come to terms with the
fracturing of power that is with the diminution of political communities
to assert anything approaching a monopoly power over the control of
behavior. How that happens will set the course for the coming era. And
perhaps both the struggle and its inevitable frustration, more than
anything else, illuminate the autonomy, the distinct personality, of law.
The permanence of the resulting constitutional deadlock, derived from
great differences in the characterization of law reified, is the great insight
for the twenty-first century.
200. See Larry Catd Backer, The Private Law of Public Law: Public Authorities As
Shareholders, Golden Shares, Sovereign Wealth Funds, And The Public Law Element In
Private Choice of Law, 82 TULANE LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2008).
201. See Larry CatAi Backer, Multinational Corporations as Objects and Sources of
Transnational Regulation, 14 ILSA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW
(forthcoming 2007-2008).
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